Various reasons may explain why oil price forecasters disagree. Bowles et al. (2007) , use of disagreement as a measure of uncertainty makes sense, to the extent that different forecasters have differing outlook assessments. This can reflect the overall uncertainty surrounding the outlook.
Different information sets or knowledge at the time the forecast is made.
Role and relevance of exogenous variables can differ in mapping to a specific price level.
Strategic Behavior -for instance to influence the oil market or to gain attention from the media. Lamont (2002) hypothesizes that if forecasters are paid according to relative ability, they might scatter, since it is hard to win when making a forecast similar to others.
However, the reverse may hold be the case as well. Uncertainty surrounding the oil price may significantly contribute to explain the disagreement observed between forecasters.
Alternatively, the disparity in forecasters' models and beliefs may lead to more divergent forecasts when oil price volatility is greater. A more volatile oil price would then lead to a higher disagreement among forecasters.
Previous examinations of crude oil price forecasts
Surprisingly enough, little attention 4 has so far been paid to the empirical analysis of disagreement between oil price forecasters, whereas the price volatility, either implied or realized, is a straightforward available measure of the uncertainty surrounding the oil price.
Singleton (2012) uses monthly oil price forecasts from Consensus Economics and finds that greater dispersion in forecasts is positively correlated with future increases in futures price volatility.
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is based on ECB SPF oil price forecasts that, until now, had been used in two other studies only. Pierdzioch et al. (2010) analyze whether oil price forecasters herd or anti-herd. Reitz et al. (2012) investigate whether regressive and extrapolative expectations exhibit significant nonlinear dynamics.
Observed Disagreement and Oil Price Volatility
Our sample uses point forecasts for quarterly average prices, the observed disagreement cannot be directly compared with oil price volatility.
The distribution of the forecasts can however be interpreted as the distribution of the average price over the quarter considered.
This raises the following question: how to infer an oil price volatility measure that is consistent with this distribution?
Under the standard assumption that the oil price follows a geometric Brownian motion, we suggest a formula that serves to derive price volatility from the distribution of forecasts.
We use this simple reduced-form model as a benchmark to translate the observed disagreement into volatility. When applied to the ECB surveys, this method results in a disagreement-based volatility that is well correlated with the volatility observed ex post.
The Data: ECB SPF oil price forecasts
The European Central Bank (ECB) has collected quarterly assumptions/forecasts of Brent crude oil prices since 2002q1 in its' Survey of Professional Forecasters 5 (SPF). These oil-price forecasts refer to the average nominal spot price of Brent over the quarter. Our sample period is from 2002q1-2012q4 which includes 44 survey rounds.
The survey includes participants from the financial sector (mostly banks), non-financial research institutes and employer or employee organizations.
The replies to the SPF are typically sent 6 between days 16 and 21 of January (Q1 survey), April (Q2), July (Q3) and October (Q4). Thus, the survey participants have market information available to them for the first 15 days of each quarter.
Initially, the SPF surveyed forecasters for the current quarter and the subsequent next four quarters. We will refer to them as the 0-4 horizon forecasts. After 2010q1, the ECB stopped collecting the 4-quarter-ahead forecast. Our panel is unbalanced.
Difference in participation across forecasters
Difference in participation by same forecaster -non-continuity 
Dispersion of forecasts, disagreement index and forecast uncertainty
Let , be the number of forecasts made in quarter t for horizon h that are considered. The u th price forecast is denoted as , , . The dispersion of forecasts is captured by the standard deviation of forecasts , , with:
where , is the mean forecast value
Our measure 7 of disagreement , in quarter t for horizon h is the ratio of the standard deviation of forecasts to the mean forecast:
7 See for instance Siklos (2012) for alternative measures of forecast disagreement; note that the forecasters of the ECB professional survey only provide point estimates for the oil price, with no information on the underlying probability distributions.
The forecast error in , , , is the difference between the actual average nominal Brent oil price and the mean forecast , made h quarters before:
If disagreement reflects forecast uncertainty, one would expect a positive correlation between the dispersion of forecasts and the subsequent forecast error.
A first approach
For all regressions, we apply the same following procedure. First, we check the stationary of both endogenous and exogenous variables with the ADF test. If the null assumption of a unit root cannot be rejected at a 5% level of significance, we perform the regression on the differenced series. Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; t-tests are based on standard errors corrected using the Newey-West procedure.
Does ex-post realized volatility explain ex-ante disagreement?
First, we estimate the (realized) volatility observed ex-post. To do so, we use weekly prices, by considering the closing spot price of the last working day of every week in the quarter. The forecasts are assumed to be conditional upon all available information at the time the forecast is produced. Since we do not know the actual date of production of these forecasts, we consider two alternative assumptions: either the forecast is produced at the start of the quarter, or it is produced just before returning the questionnaire to the ECB.
Let us consider any quarter t and let be the number of weekly prices observed from the start of quarter t until the end of the forecasted quarter at horizon h. We estimate the following two series of realized volatility, both computed as the standard deviation 9 of price returns:
1. Full quarter volatility 2. Deadline adjusted volatility -the 'full quarter' volatility , corresponding to the assumption that the forecasts are produced when the first weekly price of the quarter is observed:
Where is the k th weekly price observed during the period considered.
-the 'deadline adjusted' volatility , corresponding to the assumption that the forecasts are produced just before the deadline to return the filled questionnaire to the ECB:
Where d is the number of weekly prices realized before the deadline 10 to return the filled questionnaire to the ECB, as illustrated in Figure 4 . 10 Typically between the 17 th and the 24 th day of the first month; for each quarter, d is the last weekly price prior to the deadline indicated by the ECB at: http://www.ecb.int/stats/prices/indic/forecast/shared/files/SPF_rounds_dates.pdf?06a8d73c8231cca300071f251923c9b9
Typically between the 17 th and the 24 th day of the first month; for each quarter, d is the last weekly price prior to the deadline indicated by the ECB at: http://www.ecb.int/stats/prices/indic/forecast/shared/files/SPF_rounds_dates.pdf?06a8d7 3c8231cca300071f251923c9b9 We test for the existence of a relationship between disagreement and price volatility.
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Where , is the full-quarter disagreement-based volatiliy Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; t-tests are based on standard errors corrected using the Newey-West procedure.
Where , is the deadline-adjusted disagreement-based volatility. 
Conclusion
For short forecast horizons, we find statistical evidence that the oil price volatility observed ex post explains ex-ante disagreement between oil price forecasters of the ECB's professional survey. The results appear robust to size of panel.
Since the forecasts considered are quarterly average prices, the observed disagreement is however not directly comparable to oil price volatility. We therefore use the geometric Brownian motion as a benchmark model to translate the observed disagreement into volatility.
This may lead one to consider our disagreement index, or the disagreement-based volatility, as an informative index for future volatility in oil prices.
In other words, could one of these indices be a good predictor of oil price volatility? In this respect, they can be tested against volatility implied from derivatives markets. An interesting issue would be to determine if the volatility derived from disagreement contains incremental information, relative to the volatility priced by option markets. One might suspect that the myriads of agents interacting on these markets should reveal more about volatility than the level of disagreement between ninety forecasters. To ascertain this is left for future research.
